operations, as the Palestine Army could be largely supplied from the East, Australia, and South Africa, and the ships now used in East Africa will also soon be set free for this purpose. The contraction of the Salonika Front and the increasing pressure in Palestine must obviously have the effect of bringing the whole of the Turkish forces to the Asiatic fronts of the Turkish Empire. It must be clearly realised that unless the Russians are made to pull their full weight in Armenia and General Maude continues to threaten the enemy on his front the Palestine force is certain to meet with the most formidable opposition even before it reaches Jerusalem. In any case, if we adopt a vigorous offensive we must be prepared to face the fact that this front will in all probability assume an importance eventually second only to that of the Western Front. The coming campaign must be judged and appreciated from that point of view to prevent future surprises or disappointments.

5. *Western Front.*

THERE REMAINS FOR CONSIDERATION THE FAR MORE IMPORTANT AND COMPLICATED QUESTION OF THE WESTERN FRONT. I HAVE ALWAYS LOOKED UPON IT AS A MISFORTUNE, NO DOUBT INEVITABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT THE BRITISH FORCES HAVE BECOME SO ENTIRELY AB-

SORBED BY THIS FRONT. THE RESULT NOW IS THAT IN A THEATRE MAINLY OF THE ENEMY'S

Deadlock in the West

CHOOSING, THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT ARMIES OF THE ENTENTE ARE LOCKED UP IN FRONT OF ALMOST IMPREGNABLE POSITIONS. It is essential to our ends that we should keep the initiative and offensive, but both